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I. INTRODUCTION
In two recent cases, the United States Supreme Court and the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) were asked to determine whether religious
symbols (specifically crosses and crucifixes) could be placed on public
property.1 This was not a simple task however, as the crosses at issue in the
case served both religious and secular purposes. In addition to being crosses,
they were also war memorials and symbols of a nation’s heritage.2
Therefore, the courts were forced to address a question of which
interpretation of the symbols to use, the secular one or the religious one.
Supporters of the symbols argued that they were memorials erected in
memory of fallen soldiers and national symbols.3 Opponents contended that
the crosses were religious symbols and, as such, did not have a place in a
secular world.
Both cases involved crosses placed in highly visible locations and both
courts rendered controversial decisions that elicited strong responses from
each side.4 In the European case, Lautsi v. Italy, religious supporters in Italy,
the Catholic Church, a number of other institutions from around the world,
and some secular supporters spoke vehemently in favor of the cross.5 An
equally large number of groups, from as many varied locations, opposed it.6
In the United States case, Salazar v. Buono, the cross at issue caused such
controversy that it was stolen after the Supreme Court issued its decision.7
Because of these strong emotions, both courts had to decide between two
1
Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06 (2011) [hereinafter Lautsi II]; Salazar v. Buono, 130
S. Ct. 1803, 1811 (U.S. 2010).
2
See Peter Petkoff, Religious Symbols Between Forum Internum and Forum Externum, in
LAW AND RELIGION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 297 (Silvio Ferrari & Rinaldo Cristofori eds., 2010)
for further discussion on symbols.
3
Lautsi II, supra note 1, ¶ 15.
4
Lautsi v Italy – A Lost Opportunity, EUR. HUMANIST FED’N (July 1, 2010), http://humanistf
ederation.eu/lautsi-v-italy-a-lost-opportunity/ [hereinafter A Lost Opportunity]; Stijn Smet,
Lautsi v. Italy: The Argument from Neutrality, STRASBOURG OBSERVER (Mar. 22, 2011), http://st
rasbourgobservers.com/2011/03/22/lautsi-v-italy-the-argument-from-neutrality/. The Pope also
issued a formal condemnation of the initial Lautsi decision. Anna Arco & Cindy Wooden,
Vatican Hails Ruling on Crucifixes: European Court of Human Rights Issues ‘Landmark’
Decision in Defence of Religious Freedom, CATH. HERALD (Mar. 25, 2011), http://www.exacted
itions.com/exact/browse/397/440/8537/3/1.
5
According to the CIA World Factbook, Italy is almost 90% Roman Catholic with small
communities of Protestant, Jewish, and Muslim faiths. Italy, C.I.A. WORLD FACTBOOK,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/it.html (last updated Oct. 4,
2012) [hereinafter Italy – Factbook]. For a further discussion on those who supported Italy’s
position please see infra Part II.A, discussing the response to the European Court of Human
Rights’ first Lautsi decision.
6
See A Lost Opportunity, supra note 4 for an example of this reaction.
7
Lauri Lebo, Mojave Desert Cross is Stolen, RELIGION DISPATCHES (May 11, 2010), http://
www.religiondispatches.org/dispatches/laurilebo/2562/mojave_desert_cross_is_stolen.
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unpleasant options. If the court required that the symbols be removed it
would displease those who advocated for religious symbols in the public
square. However, allowing the symbols to stay would displease those who
advocated strict separation of church and state. The courts could have
determined that the crosses should be removed from public property because
of their relatively undisputed religious connotation as a well-recognized
symbol of the Christian faith.8 However, if the U.S. Supreme Court had
made this decision, a war memorial would have to be torn down.9 In the
European Union, a similar decision would have meant requiring a
predominantly Catholic nation to take down crucifixes in a number of
institutions.10 Furthermore, the success of a decision requiring removal of
crosses in the European Union was uncertain because the ECtHR has a
relatively small amount of influence over the states of the European Union.11
Alternatively, the courts could have allowed the crosses to remain where
they were. However, this would implicitly recognize as acceptable religious
symbols erected on public property. This outcome was unlikely in the
United States because of strong notions of strict separation of church and
state, and it would be unusual for the ECtHR given its past case history
prohibiting religious symbols on public property.12
The ECtHR in Lautsi, eventually chose to allow crucifixes to remain
displayed in public schoolrooms by accepting the secular purpose: a symbol
of national heritage.13 The issue in the United States in Salazar was more
procedurally complicated than the direct constitutionality of crosses. The
actual issue in the case was whether a land transfer act Congress used to cure
an Establishment Clause violation was constitutional.14 Congress attempted
to remedy the constitutional violations connected with a cross placed on
public property by transferring the land from public to private property.
While the Supreme Court did not rule explicitly on the constitutionality of
the cross, its decision did lay out theories of interpretation for religious
symbols with secular meanings, including addressing the constitutionality of

8
See RENÉ GUÉNON, THE SYMBOLISM OF THE CROSS (James R. Wetmore ed. Angus
Macnab trans. 2004) (discussing the symbolism of the cross).
9
Will Rosenzweig & Daniel Shatz, Salazar v. Buono, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.
cornell.edu/supct/cert/08-472 (last visited Jan. 11, 2012).
10
See Italy – Factbook, supra note 5 (describing religious demographics of Italy).
11
As will be discussed later, the ECtHR has no formal ability to enforce its actions in EU
states and instead depends on the good will of the nations for implementation. Some states,
like England, have provisions that explicitly enforce the decisions of the court. John Hedigan,
The European Court of Human Rights: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 12 GERMAN L.J.
1716, 1729 (2011).
12
See infra Part II.
13
Lautsi II, supra note 1, ¶ 80.
14
Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (U.S. 2010).
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the cross itself.15 The language in the Court’s decision may point to a more
accommodating test for religious symbols.16
Both of the decisions, the ECHR’s explicit acceptance of a crucifix in a
public school and the Supreme Court’s possible acceptance of a more
accommodating test, suggest that both courts are moving in similar
directions. Furthermore, the direction they choose will have substantial
consequences for future decisions. While the beliefs of those who supported
the cross and crucifix, including fears that courts would mandate the removal
of all religious symbols from the public sphere, have been assuaged for the
moment, many remain concerned for the future of religious symbols.17
Equally vehement are those who argue that the current position of the
ECtHR (and perhaps that of the Supreme Court) infringes on individuals who
believe that the presence of the crosses violates their right to live a life free
from religious influence.18 Thus, it appears likely that litigation on this issue
will continue.19 For now, incorporating a principle of accommodation may
be the clearest and best option for future cases. It would afford protection for
religious symbols while leaving open the possibility of rigorous review when
indoctrination or oppression is a concern.
It is not the purpose of this Note to offer a normative opinion on either of
the decisions. Rather, this Note seeks to perform an analysis of the two cases
and explain some striking similarities in the positions taken by the two
courts. Two courts, with different cases and with different historical
backgrounds and nationalities, appear ready to use or encourage tests that
would allow greater presence of religious symbols in the public square so
long as they do not invoke oppression or indoctrination. In this manner, both
of the court decisions indicate judicial openness to a principle of
accommodation. It is this, the parallel movement of the two courts reflecting
a more nuanced perspective of the place of these symbols in the public
sphere, that is the subject of this Note.

15

Id. at 1835–36.
See infra Part II.B (discussing Salazar v. Buono).
17
For example, in response to the lower European Court of Human Rights decision, Joseph
Weiler, in Crucifix in the Classroom Redux, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 5 (2010), articulated the
issue by saying that: “Is one to revoke from the public space one’s symbols as if
‘contaminated’ by their religious content? Change the British National Anthem? Amend the
first phrase of the German Constitution?”
18
Gabriel Andreescu & Liviu Andreescu, The European Court of Human Rights’ Lautsi
Decision: Context, Contents, Consequences, 9 J. STUDY RELIGIONS & IDEOLOGIES 47, 67
(2010). “A lay public sphere is the only solution to ensuring genuine equality between
members of majority and minority churches, agnostics, atheists, or non-theists. In the long
term, this is the only way to eliminate religious (and anti-religious) tensions.” Id.
19
See, e.g., Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12 (U.S. 2011)
(exemplifying a more recent case dealing with a cross placed near a public highway.
16
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To make this assertion first requires acknowledgment of the differences
between the ECtHR and the U.S. Supreme Court. The ECtHR does not
operate under a charter that specifically restricts the interaction between
church and state.20 The U.S. Constitution, on the contrary, does include
restrictions on the government’s involvement with religion.21 The different
national structures that formed the respective courts are also important
because they effectuated significant differences between the functions of the
courts. For example, the European Union is more loosely unified than the
United States and is an organization of states with unique histories, diverse
citizenship and legal requirements, as well as different forms of
government.22 Thus, a complete comparison would be inappropriate. Yet,
even with these differences, these two courts have indicated preferences for
remarkably similar decisions. Finally, note that the cases presented are not
identical. Lautsi addressed crucifixes placed in public schoolrooms.23
Therefore, concerns with indoctrination were far more prevalent than in
Salazar, where the cross at issue was a memorial placed in a public park.24
Each of these will be extensively discussed in the next section.
It is clear that singular single, concise answer to the questions before
these courts may not be forthcoming.25 Concepts of religious liberty,
particularly the symbols that proponents of each side believe they have the
right to display or avoid, are by their nature divisive.26 However, a proper
consideration of the decisions rendered is necessary before either side may
press their case.
Part II will give an outline of both Lautsi v. Italy and Salazar v. Buono
and will explain some of the relevant case law and tests used to reach each of
these decisions. Part III will discuss the similarities between the tests used
by the U.S. Supreme Court and by the ECtHR. Part IV will provide a
conclusion and briefly discuss the future of these tests.

20

John Witte, Jr. & Nina-Louisa Arold, Lift High the Cross?: Contrasting the New
European and American Cases on Religious Symbols on Government Property, 25 EMORY
INT’L L. REV. 5, 8 (2011); U.S. CONST. amend. I (laying out the Establishment Clause, which
specifically prohibits the government from making a “law respecting an establishment of
religion”).
21
U.S. CONST. amend I.
22
Christopher J. Borgen, Whose Public, Whose Order? Imperium, Region, and Normative
Friction, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 331, 343 (2007); Andrew Ashworth, Self-Incrimination in
European Human Rights Law — A Pregnant Pragmatism?, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 751 (2008).
23
Lautsi II, supra note 1.
24
Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (U.S. 2010).
25
Richard W. Garnett, Religion, Division, and the First Amendment, 94 GEO. L.J. 1667,
1707 (2006).
26
See sources cited supra notes 4, 6.
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II. THE PATH OF THE CROSSES
By the time Lautsi v. Italy and Salazar v. Buono reached the ECtHR and
the Supreme Court respectively, they had developed complicated factual
backgrounds and extensive lower court decisions. The decisions of the lower
courts are available in the records of those courts. Therefore this Note will
spend a substantial amount of time discussing the final decision in Lautsi and
focus less on the early case law.27
Salazar v. Buono will not be discussed as extensively, though this Note
will give a brief background and history of the case. The decision is slightly
older than Lautsi and has been well covered in numerous articles that more
completely and clearly elucidate that case and its background.28
A. Lautsi v. Italy
The controversy that initiated the Lautsi case was a parental disagreement
with the state-mandated display of crucifixes in Italian public schools. In
Italy, a country with a long history and relationship with the Catholic
Church, crucifixes had been a part of schools for decades. Indeed, crosses
have been displayed in Italian schoolrooms by governmental fiat for over a
hundred years.29 During that time, governing bodies in Italy, including those
prior to Italy’s unification and the Italian state itself, issued a number of
administrative decrees, regulations, and treaties either requiring or
encouraging crucifix displays. One of the earliest was a royal decree by the
Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia in 1860.30 This decree required that “each
school must without fail be equipped . . . with a crucifix.”31 This regulation
was also incorporated into the Constitution of Italy in 1861.32 In November
of 1922, a Ministry of Education circular, Circular no. 68, “order[ed] all

27

See Malcolm D. Evans, From Cartoons to Crucifixes: Current Controversies Concerning
the Freedom of Religion and the Freedom of Expression Before the European Court of
Human Rights, 26 J.L. & RELIGION 345 (2010–2011) for a full discussion on early case law
regarding religious symbols in public places.
28
See, e.g., Mary Jean Dolan, Salazar v. Buono: The Cross Between Endorsement and
History, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 42, 43 (2010); Angela C. Carmella, Symbolic
Religious Expression on Public Property: Implications for the Integrity of Religious
Associations, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 481 (2011); Marci A. Hamilton, The Endorsement
Factor, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 349 (2011).
29
R.D. n. 4336/1860 (It.), art. 140 (Royal Decree of the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia)
[hereinafter Royal Decree].
30
Id.
31
Lautsi II, supra note 1, ¶ 17 (quoting Regio Decreto, supra note 29).
32
Constituzione [Cost.] (It.).
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municipal administrative authorities in the Kingdom to restore to those
schools which lack them, the . . . sacred symbol[ ] of faith.”33
The country’s close ties to the Vatican further influenced the decision to
place crucifixes in schools.34 In 1929, Italy and the Vatican signed the
Lateran Pacts which, among other treaty provisions, confirmed Catholicism
as Italy’s official religion.35 In 1984 the pacts were amended,36 formally
revoking Catholicism as Italy’s religion in favor of a secular Italian state.37
Regardless of these developments however, many schools in Italy continued
displaying the crucifixes.38
These laws and ordinances, requiring crucifixes in classrooms, remained
relatively undisturbed until 2002 (although they were not always enforced).
In that year, Ms. Lautsi, a woman who wanted her sons to have a secular
education, initiated a case bringing her concerns about the display of the
crucifixes to her local school board.39 Her sons had attended the Istituto
comprensivo statale Vittorino da Feltre, a state run school in which a cross
was displayed.40 At a meeting of the school’s governors, Ms. Lautsi and her
husband requested that the governors consider removing the cross from the
wall so that it did not affect her sons’ education.41 The governors refused
Ms. Lautsi’s request.42
A month later, in July of 2002, Ms. Lautsi filed suit in the Veneto
Administrative Court alleging the crucifixes violated Articles 3 and 19 of the
Italian Constitution.43 While the Lautsi trial was ongoing, the Minister of
33

Lautsi II, supra note 1, ¶ 19.
Id. ¶ 20.
35
Id. Article 1 of the Concilliation Treaty states: “Italy recognizes and reaffirms the
principle established in the First Article of the Italian Constitution dated March 4 1848,
according to which the Roman Catholic Apostolic religion is the only State religion.” Id.
36
Id. ¶ 21.
37
Id. ¶¶ 21–22. Italy adopted its republican constitution in 1948, Article 7 of which
explicitly acknowledges “the State and the Catholic Church are independent and sovereign,
each in its own sphere.” Art. 7 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.).
38
Id. Lautsi II, supra note 1, ¶¶ 21–24 (providing examples of cases in which schools
continued to display crucifixes).
39
Id. ¶ 11.
40
Id. ¶ 10.
41
Id. ¶ 11.
42
Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, ¶ 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009) [hereinafter Lautsi I] (“On
27 May 2002 the school’s governors decided to leave the crucifixes in its classrooms.”).
43
Lautsi II, supra note 1, ¶ 8; see also Constituzione [Const.] (It.):
All citizens have equal social dignity and are equal before the law, without
distinction of sex, race, language, religion, political opinion, personal and
social conditions. It is the duty of the Republic to remove those obstacles of
an economic or social nature which constrain the freedom and equality of
citizens, thereby impeding the full development of the human person and the
effective participation of all workers in the political, economic and social
organisation of the country.
34
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Education, Universities, and Research published Directive no. 2666 requiring
all Italian public schools have crucifixes displayed in their classrooms.44
Before coming to a decision, the Administrative Court, which had
initially been granted jurisdiction, determined that the case was better suited
for the Constitutional Court of Italy and chose not to rule on the merits of the
case.45 The Constitutional Court, however, also determined that it would be
inappropriate for it to issue a ruling because the laws governing the display
of the crucifixes were statutory and therefore the case did not pose a
constitutional question.46 In 2004, the Constitutional Court referred the case
back to the Administrative Court.47
Finally, in March 2005, the Administrative Court issued a ruling on the
merits of Ms. Lautsi’s case.48 The court determined that the crucifixes did
not violate any of Ms. Lautsi’s rights, or the rights of her children, under the
laws of Italy.49 In explanation of its decision, the court stated that while
the principle of the secular nature of the State [was] now part
of the legal heritage of Europe and the western
democracies . . . the presence of crucifixes in State-school
classrooms, regard being had to the meaning it should be
understood to convey, did not offend against that principle.50
Ms. Lautsi then brought her case to the ECtHR according to the
procedure set forth in Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.51 The case was given to one
This was characterized by the ECtHR as the “principle of equality.” Lautsi II, supra note 1,
¶ 12. Article 19 of the Italian Constitution reads: “Anyone is entitled to freely profess their
religious belief in any form, individually, or with others, and to promote them and celebrate
rites in public or in private, provided they are not offensive to public morality.” Art. 19
Costituzione [Cost.] (It.). This was referred to by the court as “religious freedom.” Lautsi II,
supra note 1, ¶ 12.
44
Lautsi II, supra note 1, ¶ 24 (indicating a general acceptance by the Italian political
system of the crucifixes).
45
The justice system in Italy divides its cases into administrative, ordinary, and
constitutional courts. For a full explanation of the system, see The Italian Judicial System,
http://ulr.unidroit.org/mm/TheItalianJudicialSystem.pdf (last viewed Sept. 22, 2011).
46
Lautsi I, supra note 42, ¶ 12 (“In decision no. 389 of 15 December 2004 the
Constitutional Court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction, seeing that the provisions
complained of were not provisions of statute law but were contained in regulations, which did
not have legal force.”).
47
Lautsi II, supra note 1, ¶ 14.
48
Id. ¶ 15.
49
Lautsi I, supra note 42, ¶ 13 (holding that the crucifix “was both the symbol of Italian
history and culture . . . and the symbol of the principles of equality, freedom and tolerance of
the state’s secular basis”).
50
Lautsi II, supra note 1, ¶ 14 (2011) (internal citations omitted).
51
The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Art. 34,
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section of the court for initial determination. There, Lautsi alleged that the
crucifixes violated Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 9 of the European
Convention of Human Rights.52 She asserted that displaying the sign of the
cross in the state-school attended by her sons constituted interference
incompatible with her (Ms. Lautsi’s) right to ensure that they receive
education and teaching in conformity with her religious and philosophical
convictions. Furthermore, Ms. Lautsi asserted that displaying the sign of the
cross also infringed on her freedom of belief and religion.53
Ms. Lautsi’s argument was, essentially, that Italy was interfering with her
ability to raise her children with a secular ideology.
Furthermore, Ms. Lautsi claimed that,
the provisions concerned were the legacy of a religious
conception of the State which in present-day Italy was now in
conflict with the State’s duty of secularism, and infringed the
rights protected by the Convention. There was a ‘religious
question’ in Italy, since by requiring the crucifix to be
displayed in classrooms the State was granting the Catholic
Church a privileged position which amounted to State
interference with the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion of the applicant and her children and the
applicant’s right to bring up her children in conformity with her

Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter HR Convention] (regulating individual
applications to the ECtHR). Because the ECtHR’s jurisdiction is limited to hearing cases only
when the remedies and procedures in the home state [Italy], have been exhausted, Ms. Lautsi
had been previously unable to present her case to the Court. European Court of Human
Rights: The ECHR in 50 Questions, PUBLIC RELATIONS UNIT OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 7, http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/5C53ADA4-80F8-42CB-B8BD-CB
BB781F42C8/0/FAQ_ENG_A4.pdf (last visited July 2, 2013).
52
Lautsi II, supra note 1, ¶ 27; HR Convention, supra note 51. Article 2 of Protocol No. 1
provides “no person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions
which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of
parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religions and
philosophical convictions.” Id. art. 2.
Article 9 reads
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his
religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 2. Freedom
to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations
as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals,
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Id. art. 9.
53
Lautsi II, supra note 1, ¶ 41.
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moral and religious convictions, and a form of discrimination
against non-Catholics.54
It was the Lautsis’ assertion that the crucifix’s religious connotation was
so dominant that a student could only understand its presence to be a state
endorsement of religion.55 If this were true, this would be in conflict with
Italy’s secular constitution and its obligations under the European
Convention on Human Rights.56 Finally, Ms. Lautsi also argued that Italy
was favoring one religion (Catholicism or Christianity) over others.57 She
asserted that Italy was indicating an adherence to a “particular religious
belief,” rather than treating each religion equally.58 Ms. Lautsi claimed that,
“[t]he concept of secularism required the State to be neutral and keep an
equal distance from all religions, as it should not be perceived as being closer
to some citizens than to others.”59
The Italian government, however, argued that the crucifixes’ connotation
was not limited solely to its religious meaning,60 but included an “ethical
meaning which could be understood and appreciated regardless of one’s
adhesion to the religious or historical tradition, as it evoked principles that
could be shared outside Christian faith.”61 Concerned that this argument
would be unacceptable to the Court, the Italian government argued in the
alternative that the cross has no religious meaning at all.62 Instead Italy
asserted that “the message of the cross . . . could be read independently of its
religious dimension and was composed of a set of principles and values
forming the foundations of [Italy’s democracy].”63
The lower section of the ECtHR ruled in favor of the Lautsis.64 In its
decision, the Chamber highlighted several issues. First, the Chamber was
concerned that the display of the crucifixes could be misinterpreted by
students indicating a state associated with a particular religion. The
Chamber saw this as problematic because “[w]hat may be encouraging for
some religious pupils may be emotionally disturbing for pupils of other
religions or those who profess no religion.”65 Second, the Chamber noted

54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Lautsi I, supra note 42, ¶ 30.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 32.
Id. ¶¶ 34–36.
Id. ¶ 35.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 55.
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that Ms. Lautsi’s ability to raise her children was hindered when the state
engaged in behavior that favored one religion over others.66 The Chamber
explained that this hindrance occurred when few other religious symbols
were displayed in schools .67 Under this theory, children could not
reasonably expect to feel that all religions were equal. The Chamber also
required that Italy make restitution to the Lautsis as required under the
Human Rights Convention for hindering their rights.68
This decision led to an outcry in Italy and Europe.69 A number of
prominent Italian legislators stated that they would not change Italian laws
placing crucifixes in schoolrooms.70 However, it also led to great praise
from those who wished for a more secular Europe.71 Unsurprisingly, given
the tremendous outcry, the Grand Chamber swiftly granted Italy’s appeal of
the Lautsi case.72
The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR, the final decision making body of the
Court, decided the case on March 18, 2011.73 The arguments presented to
the Court at oral argument and in brief remained fairly similar to those in the
earlier Lautsi case. However, this time, numerous governments and
organizations were given leave to intervene and express an opinion. The
governments of Armenia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Russian Federation, Greece,
Lithuania, Malta, and the Republic of San Marino, as well as a number of
legislators from the European Council and several independent
organizations, intervened on behalf of both Ms. Lautsi and Italy.74 The case
and its final outcome were closely watched.
After deliberation, the Court ruled in Italy’s favor.75 The Court based its
decision on the concept of the margin of appreciation.76 This doctrine holds
66

Id. ¶ 47(b) (stating: “It is on to the fundamental right to education that is grafted the right
of parents to respect for their religious and philosophical convictions, and the first sentence
does not distinguish, any more than the second, between State and private teaching.”).
67
Id. ¶ 43.
68
Id. ¶¶ 67–70.
69
Lautsi v Italy: Crucifixes in the Classroom and ‘Dialogue’ with Strasbourg (Italian
style), EDU. L. BLOG (Mar. 29, 2011, 4:18 PM), http://www.education11kbw.com/?p=263.
70
Andreescu & Andreescu, supra note 18.
71
Grégor Puppinck, Lautsi v. Italy: The Leading Case on Majority Religions in European
Secular States, PRESENTATION PREPARED FOR THE 2010 ANNUAL INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
RELIGION SYMPOSIUM 1 (2010).
72
Lautsi II, supra note 1.
73
Id.
74
Id. ¶ 8 (intervening groups include the Greek Helsinki Monitor, Associazione nazionale
del libero pensiero, European Centre for Law and Justice, Eurojuris, International
Commission of Jurists, Interights and Human Rights Watch, Zentralkomitee der deutschen
katholiken, Semaines sociales de France, Associazioni cristiane lavoratori italiani, and thirtythree members of the European Parliament).
75
Id. ¶ 66 (stating there was no evidence that “the display of a religious symbol on
classroom walls may have an influence on pupils and so it cannot reasonably be asserted that
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that “the Contracting States [of the European Convention on Human Rights]
enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in determining the steps to be taken to
ensure compliance with the Convention with due regard to the needs and
resources of the community and of individuals.”77 The doctrine grants to the
courts and to the contracting states of the European Union a great deal of
flexibility in determining their states’ laws in relation to the various
conventions.78 While the doctrine does not allow for a direct violation of the
Convention, it does allow states to incorporate their national heritages and
norms in conforming with the Conventions.79
In reaching their decision, the Grand Chamber understood that the states
of the European Union have an obligation to protect the rights of parents and
students in public schooling.80 The Court noted that:
the decision whether crucifixes should be present in Stateschool classrooms forms part of the functions assumed by the
respondent State in relation to education and teaching and,
accordingly, falls within the scope of the second sentence of
Article 2 of Protocol No. 1. That makes it an area in which the
State’s obligation to respect the right of parents to ensure the
education and teaching of their children in conformity with
their own religious and philosophical convictions comes into
play.81
However, the Court also determined that none of these rights held by the
Lautsis had been violated by Italy’s policy supporting crucifixes.82 Instead,
the Court decided that because the crucifixes were not used for educational
purposes or even discussed, Ms. Lautsi’s rights were not infringed; meaning
that the mere display of the crucifixes did not in fact keep her from raising
her children in a secular manner.83 The Grand Chamber also determined that
the policy Italy had pursued did not indicate a particular preference for any
one religion, as no child was prohibited from expressing a different religious

it does or does not have an effect on young persons whose convictions are still in the process
of being formed”).
76
Id. ¶ 68.
77
Id. ¶ 61.
78
See Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International
Law?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907, 908 (2005) (asserting that the margin of appreciation doctrine
has been classified as “non-intrusive”).
79
Id.
80
Lautsi II, supra note 1, ¶ 14.
81
Id. ¶ 65.
82
Id.
83
Id. ¶ 66.
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preference.84 Therefore, because Italy did not prohibit any other religious
faiths from being freely practiced in their schools, no person could
reasonably decide that Italy had indoctrinated its students or chosen one
religion over another.85
Forming the boundary of the Grand Chamber’s decision were a number
of other decisions addressing the ability of a member state, like Italy, to
regulate religion and religious expression within its borders. Some cases
dealt with questions of religious garb or education in schools, while others
dealt with the use of religion in holding public office.86 Other cases went so
far as to address religion in television.87 Many of these decisions appear
contradictory, but were relevant to the ECtHR’s decision in Lautsi.
One case that became relevant to the Lautsi issue was Sahin v. Turkey.88
This case, decided in 2004, dealt with a prohibition of Islamic headscarves in
Turkey.89 A medical student studying at a university was denied admission
to classes because she wore a headscarf in violation of Turkey’s secular
regulations banning the wearing of religious regalia.90 Turkey had not
required the universities to enforce a preexisting headscarf restriction in
classes, and Sahin had worn the headscarf to class in the past.91 Turkey,
however, changed its policy and, after advertising the change to students,
formally banned all religious garb, turning away any who came to class

84

Id.

Id. ¶ 74. The Court noted that
according to the indications provided by the Government, Italy opens up the
school environment in parallel to other religions. The government indicated
in this connection that it was not forbidden for pupils to wear Islamic
headscarves or other symbols or apparel having a religious connotation;
alternative arrangements were possible to help schooling fit in with nonmajority religious practices; the beginning and end of Ramadan were ‘often
celebrated’ in schools; and optional religious education could be organized in
schools for ‘all recognized religious creeds’ . . . Moreover, there was nothing
to suggest that the authorities were intolerant of pupils who believed in other
religions, were non-believers or who held non-religious philosophical
convictions.

85
Id. ¶ 66 (noting that because Islamic students were able to wear their headscarves and
pray, and because Jewish students were able to observe Hanukkah, the crucifixes were not
enough to violate the European Convention). This distinction became key to the decision and
is a distinguishing factor between Lautsi and many of the cases discussed in this Note.
86
Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005); Grzelak v. Poland, App. No.
7710/02 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010); Folgreo and Others v. Norway, App. No. 1572/02 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2007).
87
Otto Preminger Institut v. Austria, Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), App. No. 13470/87 (1994).
88
Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005).
89
Id. ¶ 3.
90
Id. ¶ 16.
91
Id. ¶ 17.
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dressed in the banned attire.92 When Sahin tried to enter her classroom, she
was refused admittance.93 Sahin claimed that this refusal violated her rights
under the Human Rights Convention and, after a thorough review in Turkey,
appealed the law to the ECtHR.94
The ECtHR determined that Turkey’s law did not violate the
Convention’s requirements.95 The court explained that while “having regard
to the Contracting States’ margin of appreciation in this [religious regulation]
sphere, the court finds that the interference in issue was justified in principle
and proportionate to the aim pursued.”96
Another relevant case was Otto Preminger Institut v. Austria, in which
the ECtHR allowed Austria to regulate and ban a movie that depicted the
Holy Family in an inappropriate manner.97 In another case, Kokkinakis v.
Greece, the ECtHR concluded that a Greek law outlawing proselytism was
legal under Article 9 of the Convention.98 Furthermore, in Grzelak v. Poland
and Folgero v. Norway (both cases mentioned by the ECtHR in the Lautsi
decision), the court dealt with various regulations requiring students to
receive religious education while they were in schools.99 During these cases
“the court dealt with forms of religious instruction in public schools that
were challenged by professed atheists and agnostics . . . . It found that the
state had not tailored its new law carefully enough to deal with students with
different religious and non-religious sensibilities.”100 Therefore, in reaching
each decision the Court was aware of and considered the different facts and
contexts of each case, as well as the various nations and nationalities
involved.
1. Using the Margin of Appreciation
The margin of appreciation was crucial to the Grand Chamber’s decision
in Lautsi. Without its use, it is unlikely that the court would have ruled in
Italy’s favor. As mentioned before, the margin of appreciation is a doctrine
the court uses to allow the states of the European Union greater flexibility in
charting the course of individual social issues.101
92

Id. ¶ 16.
Id. ¶ 17.
94
Id. ¶¶ 70, 18–20.
95
Id. ¶ 162.
96
Id. ¶ 122.
97
Otto Preminger Institut v. Austria, Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), App. No. 13470/87 (1994).
98
Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/88 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1993).
99
Grzelak v. Poland, App. No. 7710/02 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010); Folgreo and Others v.
Norway, App. No. 1572/02 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007).
100
Witte & Arold, supra note 20, at 19.
101
See Shany, supra note 78; HOWARD CHARLES YOUROW, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION
93
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Generally, if the ECtHR determines that an action taken by a state
violates the European Convention on Human Rights, the action is determined
to fall outside of the state’s authority.102 When this occurs, the margin of
appreciation cannot protect the state’s actions and the law or decision is
likely to fall as a violation of the Convention.103 However, when an action
the state has taken merely suggests a violation of the Convention, but may
not rise to an actual breach, the doctrine may be used by the court to uphold
the State’s action if it comports with the state’s ethics and norms.104 When
this occurs, the state is generally allowed greater latitude in determining how
to handle controversial issues.105
The use of this doctrine is highly fact specific and greatly influenced by
the culture of the appealing state, and its use can result in seemingly
inconsistent decisions.106 For example, in the Sahin case the ECtHR
determined that it was acceptable for Turkey to prohibit the wearing of
religious garb in universities. However, in Lautsi, the ECtHR allowed
crucifixes to remain in the classrooms.107 Though these cases may appear
inconsistent due to the nature of the challenges, within the confines of the
doctrine of margin of appreciation they are not so untenable.
The key difference between the two cases is an all or nothing concept.108
For example, if Turkey proscribes all religious garb rather than targeting any
group specifically, this is likely to be considered an equal, if burdensome,
restriction. The Turkish law may suggest violations of the Convention’s
protection of religious participation as it does affect religious practice, but
does not, at least as the ECtHR has interpreted the Convention, violate it.
However, if some groups were allowed to wear their religious garb and other
groups were targeted and prohibited from wearing religious clothing, the
validity of the law would be far more suspect. As applied to the case at
issue, the crucifix law fell within the doctrine of the margin of appreciation,

DOCTRINE IN THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE 13 (1996)
(discussing the application of the margin of appreciation).
102
See generally Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005) (discussing the
general application of the test).
103
Shany, supra note 78, at 910.
104
Id.
105
See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Brauch, The Margin of Appreciation and the Jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights: Threat to the Rule of Law, 11 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 113, 119
(2004–2005).
106
Shany, supra note 78, at 910.
107
Sahin, App. No. 44774/98.
108
This line of reasoning can also be found in cases like ABC v. Ireland where the Court
determined that a state could proscribe abortion entirely, but, if the state allowed abortion in
even extremely limited circumstances it, needed to ensure that abortion was available if the
circumstances could be proven. A, B, and C v. Ireland, App. No. 25579/05 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2010).
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because Italy allowed some crucifixes to be displayed but did not prohibit the
display of other religious symbols.109
B. Salazar v. Buono
Salazar v. Buono is a case that arose because of a cross placed at a
national park as a war memorial to those who died in World War I by the
Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW).110 The cross, an eight foot tall structure
made of metal tubes, was placed on top of Sunrise Rock in the Mojave
National Preserve in San Bernardino County, California.111 The VFW placed
the cross on Bureau of Land Management property in 1934, “along with a
plaque memorializing the ‘Dead of All Wars’; though the plaque later
disappeared.”112
The cross remained in its place, undisturbed, for over sixty years. Not
only was it a war memorial, but Easter Sunday services were also celebrated
at the site of the cross.113 However, the situation changed when, in 1999, the
U.S. Park Service refused to allow a group to build a Buddhist stupa near the
site of the cross on public property.114 The Park Service decided instead to
remove the cross to avoid Establishment Clause concerns.115 Congress
refused to appropriate the money that would have allowed the Park Service
to remove the cross and “then designated it a national memorial to veterans
of World War I; and, for good measure, prohibited the use of federal money
to ‘dismantle’ a[ ] World War I memorial[ ].”116
However, a Park Service administrator brought a claim alleging that when
a cross was placed on public property and the same public property was “not
open to groups or individuals [wishing] to erect other freestanding,
permanent displays,” there was a violation of the Establishment Clause.117
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the administrator and the case was not
appealed to the Supreme Court.118
However, instead of removing the cross, Congress initiated a land transfer
moving the cross from public property to private property.119 This was
109

Lautsi II, supra note 1.
Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (U.S. 2010).
111
Ian Bartrum, Salazar v. Buono: Sacred Symbolism and the Secular State, 105 NW. U. L.
REV. COLLOQUY 31, 31–32 (2010).
112
Id.
113
Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1812.
114
Bartrum, supra note 111, at 31–32.
115
Id. (discussing the history of the case’s early foundation).
116
Id.
117
Brief for the Petitioners at 5, Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (U.S. 2010) (No. 08472), 2009 WL 1526915; see also Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
118
Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 546, 550 (9th Cir. 2004).
119
Id. at 545.
110
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facilitated by an order from Congress to the Secretary of the Interior
demanding an exchange of the parcel of land on which the cross was placed
for another similarly situated parcel of private property.120 Congress’s orders
also required “the proviso that the property would revert to the government if
the [land was not] . . . ‘maintained as a war memorial.’ ”121 By taking this
action Congress hoped to make the case moot as the cross would no longer
be on public property and would theoretically be outside the realm of
Establishment Clause rules.122 However, this action itself implicated
constitutional concerns since it was an action taken by Congress to protect a
religious symbol. It was this, the constitutionality of the land transfer, that
was appealed and reached the U.S. Supreme Court.123
The decision of the Supreme Court was fractured. There were three
concurrences and two dissents, in addition to the Court’s opinion.124 The fact
that the actual case the Court decided did not deal directly with the
constitutionality of the cross was the root cause of the Court’s splintered
decisions.125 Thus it was, and is, difficult to draw a clear conclusion from
the Court’s decision.
Indeed, the Court did not offer a decision on whether or not the land
transfer cured the Establishment Clause violations found by the Ninth
Circuit.126 Instead, the Court determined that the issue of the land transfer
should be remanded to the lower court to issue a ruling before any further
determination was made.127
This decision was, however, quickly rendered moot. The cross, which
had been covered by a box during the course of the Court’s decision-making
process, was stolen.128 Although a temporary cross was erected in its place,
that cross was removed by the Park Service.129 Currently, the case is still
winding its way through the court system. In this, the ultimate fate for the
cross on Sunrise Rock remains as mysterious as its actual whereabouts.

120

Id.
Bartrum, supra note 111, at 32; Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub.
L. No. 108-87, § 8121, 117 Stat. 1054 (2003).
122
Bartrum, supra note 111, at 32–33.
123
Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (U.S. 2010).
124
Id.
125
Dolan, supra note 28, at 43.
126
Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1808.
127
Id. at 1809.
128
Dolan, supra note 28, at 43–44.
129
Id. at 44; Stanley Fish, When is a Cross a Cross?, N.Y. TIMES OPINION PAGES (May 3,
2010, 9:00 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/03/when-is-a-cross-a-cross/.
121
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1. The Reasonable Observer
A number of cases shed light on the Court’s Establishment Clause
decision-making, although it would be difficult to clearly elucidate them all
in this Note.130 However, the tests used to determine if a display of a
religious symbol on public property violates the Establishment Clause are
important to the discussion in this Note. Thus, we will focus on the
reasonable observer test.131
Generally, the test, part of the hybrid Lemon/endorsement test requires
that “a court . . . consider[ ] whether a reasonable observer, aware of the
history and context of the community and forum in which the religious
display appears, would understand it [the cross] to endorse religion or one
religion over another.”132 While the history and context surrounding the
display of a religious symbol are relevant, it is unclear exactly how much a
“reasonable observer” is expected to know or indeed who the “reasonable
observer” is expected to be.133 The Court and the ECtHR both appeared
ready to evaluate their respective tests of religious symbols in public spaces.
III. ACCOMMODATION AS THE DECIDING PRINCIPLE
A. A Dual Movement to Accommodation?
A consistent criticism of the first Lautsi decision was that the ECtHR
appeared to assert a preference for symbols segregated from their religious
background over those symbols whose religious theme could not be so
removed.134 For example, Italy argued in the first Lautsi case that the
crucifix no longer had a religious meaning of any merit.135 In Salazar, the
130
See, e.g., LEONARD WILLIAMS LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT (1994) (discussing the relevant tests).
131
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (establishing the
reasonable observer test).
132
16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 452.
133
Kristi L. Bowman, Seeing Government Purpose Through the Objective Observer’s Eyes:
The Evolution-Intelligent Design Debates, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 417, 452–52 (2006).
The application of this test has been criticized in the court. See McCreary Cnty. v. Am. Civil
Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 901 (2005) (noting Justice Scalia’s argument that “the
legitimacy of a government action with a wholly secular effect would turn on the
misperception of an imaginary observer that the government officials behind the action had
the intent to advance religion”) (emphasis in original); see also David Cole, Faith and
Funding: Toward an Expressivist Model of the Establishment Clause, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 559,
584 (2002) (arguing that “the test provides few clear guidelines, and appears to turn on
judges’ inevitably subjective assessments of a hypothetical reasonable observer’s perceptions
about the cultural significance of state practices”).
134
Lautsi I, supra note 42, ¶ 35.
135
Id.

GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 8/28/2013 11:20 AM

2013]

LAUTSI AND SALAZAR

525

Supreme Court likewise appeared wary of a war memorial in the form of a
cross, seeming more comfortable with war memorials that did not have a
secondary religious meaning.136
However, the recent decision by the ECtHR’s Grand Chamber in Lautsi v.
Italy and the Supreme Court’s decision in Salazar v. Buono may suggest that
the respective courts have become more favorable to a line of reasoning that
incorporates and accepts both the religious meaning of a symbol and its
secular purpose. For example, the Lautsi decision utilized the concept of
margin of appreciation in order to grant the state of Italy greater freedom in
determining a use of religious symbols in the public square. It can further be
argued that in the most recent Salazar case, the U.S. Supreme Court
indicated preference for a test that would allow religious symbols to remain
on state property. These tests would be more accommodating of the
symbols’ purpose, both religious and secular.137 It is this, the parallel
movement of the two courts, reflecting a more nuanced perspective of the
place of these symbols in the public sphere, that is of most interest.
Lautsi necessitated the need to balance the ideals of the majority, those
who prefer the use of religious symbols in Italy, against the needs of the
minority, those who prefer that crosses be absent from public spaces.138 This
concern with balance reflected the ECtHR’s awareness that the complete
removal of crucifixes from Italy would be a more difficult course of action
than it would have been in a country with a lesser level of religious
affiliation.139
Furthermore, the Grand Chamber was likely cognizant of the danger of
affiliating too closely with one side of the argument. The Chamber did not
wish to render a decision that would result in the removal of crucifixes
because a group of individuals found their presence offensive.140 Nor does it
appear from the text that the Grand Chamber wished to encourage the states
to practice religious indoctrination in public schools.141 To make a decision
without sacrificing either of these two competing interests, the court engaged
in a factual determination balancing these two concerns of indoctrination and
majoritarian preferences.
136

Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1808 (U.S. 2010).
Dolan, supra note 28, at 41–45.
138
Joseph Weiler’s Testimony before the European Court of Human Rights, dotSUB, July
28, 2010, available at http://dotsub.com/view/65bc5332-aa10-4b8c-bc50-d051e8f4fcc7.
139
See, e.g., Isabelle Rorive, Religious Symbols in the Public Space: In Search of a
European Answer, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2669, 2670 (2009); Peter G. Danchin, Islam in the
Secular Nomos of the European Court of Human Rights, 32 MICH. J. INT’L. L. 663, 701–03
(2011) (discussing France’s relationship with religion).
140
Lautsi II, supra note 1, ¶ 66.
141
Id. ¶ 71. This is also the root issue behind a number of cases in schools regarding
religious education.
137
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First, the ECtHR dealt with the concern of indoctrination.142 The ECtHR
explained that the simple presence of a religious symbol that “undoubtedly
refers to Christianity . . . is not in itself sufficient . . . to denote a process of
indoctrination on the respondent State’s part and establish a breach of the
requirements of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1.”143 In this statement, the court
indicated that the presence of religious symbols alone do not violate the
Convention simply because the symbols were placed publicly.144
Furthermore, because Italy had mandated the crosses’ placement, the
ECtHR’s decision also implicitly suggested that a government’s overt
support of a religious symbol, even when the state’s constitution mandated a
secular government, did not constitute indoctrination.145 Instead, the court
required that there be some other factor to render symbol’s existence in the
public square so egregious that the symbol could not remain where it was
without violating the Convention’s protection of freedom of religion.146
To support this, the ECtHR explained its decisions in the Folgero and
Zengin cases.147 At issue in these cases were religious education classes in
public schools.148 The ECtHR evaluated the totality of the circumstances and
held that the teaching of religion was not so egregious that it fell outside the
realm of the margin of appreciation.149 Members of minority religions
brought both the cases, objecting to the presence of religious education that
they alleged focused too heavily on the majority religion in Turkey and
Norway, the nations in question.150
Zengrin was highly relevant to Lautsi. In Zengrin, the ECtHR determined
that religious education classes could focus more heavily on the majority
religion of the state (Turkey) simply because the religion which was being
given preferential treatment was the “majority religion practiced in
Turkey.”151 Thus, the Court relied on Folgero and Zengrin when it decided

142

Id. ¶¶ 69–71.
Id. ¶ 71.
144
See, e.g., Danchin, supra note 139, at 721–23 (comparing Judge Bonello’s and Judge
Power’s concurring opinions).
145
Art. 7 Constituzione [Cost.] (It.) (requiring that the Catholic Church and Italian
government be independent).
146
An example of a situation that would rise to the level the court required would be
requiring people to swear on the bible or otherwise invoke religious persons in order to serve
as a member of a parliament or governing body. Buscarini and Others v. San Marino, App.
No. 24645/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999).
147
Folgero and Others v. Norway, App. No. 15472/02 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007); Hasan and
Eylem Zengin v. Turkey, App. No. 1448/04 Eur. Ct. H.R. Former (2007).
148
See sources cited supra note 147.
149
Lautsi II, supra note 1, ¶ 71.
150
Folgero, App. No. 15472/02 (2007); Zengin, App. No. 1448/04 (2007).
151
Lautsi II, supra note 1, ¶ 71 (discussing the Court’s previous decisions in Folgero and
Zengrin).
143
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that majoritarian preferences could be considered.152 Additionally, to
address the concerns of indoctrination on the part of the state, the ECtHR
relied on evidence that Italian schools freely encouraged the practice of other
religions.153
The ECtHR also addressed concerns of indoctrination by deciding that the
crucifix was a “passive symbol.”154 The court noted that the crucifixes in
schools were not addressed, gestured at, or remarked upon while studying or
teaching students in class.155 Thus, the ECtHR felt that the crucifixes were
unlikely to have the same effect on a student as, say, a teacher wearing a
headscarf in a classroom.156 By including this analysis, the ECtHR
distinguished the Lautsi case from the headscarf cases discussed earlier.157
Finally, the ECtHR determined that Ms. Lautsi’s individual perception of
the crucifix was not enough to prove a violation of the Convention.158 This
final assertion allows the Lautsi decision to be reconciled with the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Salazar v. Buono because it changed the focus
of interpretation for cases of religious symbols. Now, both courts look ready
to examine their interpretations more narrowly.
By allowing the crucifixes to remain, the Grand Chamber prevented Ms.
Lautsi from asserting that her individual perception of a symbol could itself
prove a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights. It also
soothed concerns that every religious symbol could be deemed a violation of
the convention because one person found it objectionable.159 However, in
making this determination, the court accepted, and has been criticized for
adopting, a majoritarian perspective towards questions of religion.160
By taking this route, the ECtHR was able to accommodate the vastly
different ideologies and perspectives towards religion existent in modern
Europe. In heavily emphasizing the concern of indoctrination, the court left
open the possibility that, in other cases where there are more egregious
circumstances, the court might make a different decision. In those cases, it
appears likely that the court will scrutinize the situation more carefully and
may not apply the margin of appreciation.

152

Id.
Id. ¶ 74.
154
Id. ¶ 72.
155
See id. (discussing the passive nature of crucifixes).
156
Id. ¶ 74; see also Dahlab v. Switzerland, App. No. 42393/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001).
157
Lautsi II, supra note 1, ¶ 73.
158
Id. ¶ 66.
159
See Weiler, supra note 17, at 4 (noting the different approaches to religion).
160
Andrea Pin, Public Schools, the Italian Crucifix, and the European Court of Human
Rights: The Italian Separation of Church and State, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 95, 97–98
(2011).
153
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Politically, the Grand Chamber’s decision was reasonable.161 It protected
the ECtHR from the wrath of many organizations that viewed the decision of
the lower chamber as a violation of religious freedoms. By focusing on
indoctrination, as well as classifying the crucifix as a passive symbol and a
representation of the Italian State, the ECtHR was able to distinguish Lautsi
from prior decisions. Thus, the court could reasonably uphold both the
Italian crucifixes and the Turkish ban on religious dress in universities.162
The doctrine, by refusing to allow a single subjective interpretation of a
symbol to determine its validity in the public square, is similar to the concept
of a “reasonable observer.”163 This is because both methods require highly
factual observations of the circumstances and do not bow to subjective
interpretations of a symbol.164 Yet the ECtHR, by applying the margin of
appreciation doctrine, goes slightly beyond the “reasonable observer” test.165
The ECtHR, for better or for worse, may accommodate the majority religious
perspectives of the various nations under its jurisdiction, while not
completely abdicating its responsibility to protect minority religions from
indoctrination. In this manner, the ECtHR was able to deal with the question
of religious symbols which hold alternate non-religious meanings.
There is some evidence the U.S. Supreme Court, like the ECtHR in
Lautsi, is moving towards a test that would allow a greater accommodation
of religious symbols.166 After the 2010 decision in Salazar v. Buono, some
have argued in favor of new theories of interpretation regarding religious
symbols placed on public property.167 These newly argued theories focus
less on the traditional two pronged endorsement tests used in past cases.168
One of these alternative tests may arguably expand the reasonable observer
test. The other argues that religious symbols, which do not have a strongly
indoctrinating or highly offensive character, should be acceptable within the
public sphere normatively. Both of these tests bear striking resemblances to
some of the abovementioned theories relied upon in Lautsi v. Italy.
The first theory can be interpreted as a reimagining of the reasonable
observer test. It requires what has been categorized as an “extraordinarily
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See generally Lisa Shaw Roy, Salazar v. Buono: The Perils of Piecemeal Adjudication,
105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 72 (2010).
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Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 691–92 (2005); Roy, supra note 167, at 80–82.
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reasonable observer.”169 This test would operate within the traditional sphere
of the endorsement test, but would require an observer that has a unique
understanding of the circumstances related to the religious symbol.170 For
example, in Salazar the observer would be considered aware of the fact that
the VFW placed the cross on the land and that Congress had deemed the
cross a memorial for World War I veterans.171 Thus, it would not be enough
that the observer only understood the religious connotation of the cross.172
The hypothetical observer necessary to the test would also have to
understand that the cross served the purpose of a memorial.173 Furthermore,
the observer would have to be able to rationally consider and balance the
religious symbolism of cross with its secular purpose, and then determine if
the symbol constituted a government endorsement of religion.174
The second theory that has been espoused is that of accommodation.175
This theory holds that “[t]he Constitution does not oblige government to
avoid any public acknowledgment of religion’s role in society[,] . . . [r]ather,
it leaves room to accommodate divergent values within a constitutionally
permissible framework.”176
It has been argued that this second theory is the predominate preference
of the Court held by Justices Kennedy, Alito, Scalia, Thomas and Breyer.177
Breyer’s rationale is that “cultural strife may be avoided when the Court’s
Establishment Clause jurisprudence does not demand removal of every
longstanding religious symbol from the public square.”178 According to Lisa
169
Dolan, supra note 28, at 48; see also Roy, supra note 167, at 80–87; Douglas G. Smith,
The Constitutionality of Religious Symbolism after McCreary and Van Orden, 12 TEX. REV. L.
& POL. 93, 106 (2007) (outlining the reasonable observer test in various cases before
criticizing it); Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky. v. Mercer Cnty., 432 F.3d 624, 638–39 (6th
Cir. 2005) (noting that “fortunately, the reasonable person is not a hyper-sensitive plaintiff”).
170
Dolan, supra note 28, at 48; Adam Linkner, How Salazar v. Buono Synthesizes the
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57, 66 (2011) (suggesting the observer must appreciate the moral dilemma Congress faced
between honoring the memorial and respecting the Establishment Clause).
171
Shari Seidman Diamond & Andrew Koppelman, Measured Endorsement, 60 MD. L.
REV. 713, 722 (2001) (explaining Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Capitol Square Review &
Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995)).
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history for this Nation and its people.”).
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Shaw Roy, it seems unlikely that the Court still views religious symbols or
monuments as outsiders.179 For example, she asserts that
Alito stated that a monument ‘may be intended to be
interpreted, and may in fact be interpreted by different
observers in a variety of ways.’ Particularly in the context of
symbols and displays, without a reasonable observer who can
discern a message of exclusion the endorsement test loses
much of its content.180
In other words, because the endorsement test is dependent on a reasonable
observer, which may not exist, it is not always the best test to use when
evaluating religious symbols.
The use of an accommodation approach has not been universally accepted
and is complicated by the fact that Salazar does not explicitly rule on the
constitutionality of the cross.181 However, if the Court does truly move in
this direction and is dedicated to this path, it may offer a possibility, much
like that sought in Lautsi, to preserve religious symbols in the public square
without violating individual rights. Some have criticized the accommodation
approach as disingenuously “dereligionizing” sectarian symbols,182 but that
perspective is too simplistic.183 Like the application of the margin of
appreciation doctrine, the accommodation doctrine “does not demand a
choice between two undesirable extremes—on the one hand, an obsessive
focus on religion to the exclusion of important historical and cultural
realities; and on the other, an implausible denial of a symbol’s religious
character.”184
In sum, both the ECtHR in Lautsi and the Supreme Court in Salazar, may
be ready to espouse a doctrine of accommodation. In applying this doctrine,
the courts will make highly fact-specific decisions that evaluate the totality
of the circumstances in which the religious symbols exist. Yet, within that
context, the courts will also leave open the possibility that further cases can
be brought when there are examples of severe indoctrination or suppression
of individual rights. Finally, by applying this test, the courts reaffirm that it
is difficult, if not impossible, to remove the religious connotation of a cross.
Thus, the courts may accept that regardless of religious connotation, there are
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some circumstances in which crosses will not violate religious freedom
clauses simply because they are located on public ground.
In the end, these two cases, though both factually and procedurally
complex, represent a similarity of thought and ideology in two different
courts halfway across the globe. This similarity could signal a trend that,
should it continue, points toward a global application of the accommodation
doctrine.
IV. CONCLUSION
Even with the extensive review and discussion that the decisions of Lautsi
and Salazar have wrought in their respective jurisdictions, it is unclear how
they will ultimately affect jurisprudence in either the European Union or the
United States. The ECtHR has been criticized for offering a politically
expedient decision in the Grand Chamber’s ruling on Lautsi rather than a
legally sound point.185 If this is the predominant interpretation that is
eventually attached to Lautsi, then there is little need to evaluate the Court’s
approach to symbols as an espousal of an accommodation principle.
However, to assert that Lautsi was simply a political decision without
evaluating its merits and its historical foundations would be unfair to the
complexity of the issue. On the other hand, the argument that the U.S.
Supreme Court does not yet espouse a theory of accommodation is more than
fair.186 Due to the procedural complications of the Salazar case itself, it is
hard to declare anything definitive.
The Supreme Court recently denied certiorari to a case, American Atheists
v. Duncan in which the Tenth Circuit determined that crosses placed on the
side of a highway as commemorative markers for dead policemen were
unconstitutional.187 This case would have been an ideal test to determine
whether the Court had truly moved towards a more accommodating test of
religious symbols. It is possible that, by refusing certiorari, the Court
intended to disprove this notion and signal instead a reaffirmation of the
more doctrinally rigorous reasonable observer/endorsement tests.188 Yet, it is
hard to ignore the language that the Justices used as they debated the
constitutionality of the land transfer of the cross in the desert.
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The logic in the decision offered by the Grand Chamber in Lautsi v. Italy
and by the various Justices in Salazar v. Buono is remarkably similar. In
both cases the courts were faced with a highly controversial decision about a
religious symbol placed in a public space open to many observers. That both
courts appear ready to espouse a doctrine that would allow religious symbols
to remain on public property may point towards the chosen path for each of
these courts.
Because of their role as final arbiter of disputes between governments and
their people, the Supreme Court and the ECtHR will have to chart a course
that protects individual rights without trampling on collective cultural and
religious identities. For now incorporating a principle of accommodation
may be the best option, as it would afford protection for religious symbols
while leaving open the possibility of rigorous review when indoctrination or
oppression are concerns.
For the European Union, the beginnings of the course of accommodation
appear through the fact-sensitive evaluation which duly considers concerns
about indoctrination and intimidation. By choosing this course, the ECtHR
allowed the countries of the European Union to display religious symbols so
long as the same states did not restrict the rights of other people to practice
their religion or lack of religion. In addition, through the use of the margin
of appreciation doctrine, the court allowed individual countries to chart their
own paths.
The course for the Supreme Court and the establishment jurisprudence
remains less clear.189 The rules and tests used for purported violations of the
Establishment Clause remain convoluted and unsure, applied differently by
numerous courts.190 Regardless, it appears there is the possibility that the
Court, like the ECtHR, will move towards a more accommodating test when
questioning religious symbols. This new test would recognize the religious
nature of these symbols but would not sacrifice their other meanings to the
religious connotation.
Finally, if this is the course that the courts choose to take, there will be
substantial consequences for future challenges to crosses placed on public
property. In the European Union, it appears that challengers will not only
need to show that the cross is capable of substantial indoctrination but that
the individual challenger’s interpretation of the cross will not be sufficient to
sustain a challenge. This showing will have to be accomplished within the
context of a highly fact-specific case in which every relevant factor is taken
into account when considering possible indoctrination. This test will be
fairly similar in the United States if the Supreme Court applies the
189
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accommodation principle that this Note anticipates. In the United States, if
the Court chooses to utilize the hyper reasonable observer principle, a
challenger will have to show that a person viewing the cross, who has every
ounce of the relevant information, could not see the cross’s existence as
anything other than an endorsement of religion. Thus, both courts appear
ready to use a similar principle to determine the cross’s validity. The fact
that these questions have arisen for both courts is not surprising. What is
interesting is that both courts appear willing to address the question in
similar ways through a concept of accommodation.

